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1. INTRODUCTION:
Budgeting is an important aspect of organizational life. Lowe and Shaw (1968, p.304)
refer to the annual budgeting procedure as probably the most important single decision
and control routine of a firm from both the organizational and economic management
viewpoints. Budgets provide a focus on planning, both short-term and strategic, on
coordination of organizational activities, on control of organizational resources and on
organizational performance. Budgets are also used for behavioral purposes: for
motivating managers' both in commitment and performance, as a means of control over
managers' activities and as a benchmark against which to measure managers'
performance.
As stated by Kamin and Ronen (1981, p.471), the budget is the skeleton of the control
system and as such reflects the organization's goals and is therefore used as both a
yardstick for future planning and a performance standard against which to measure actual
performance. Schiff and Lewin (1968, p.51) refer to the budget in its final form as an
explicit elaboration of organizational commitments for the year that reflects the resolution
of demands for resources made by the various subunits of the firm.
Implementation of budgets have behavioral effects other than those intended by higher
level management. Milani (1975, p.274) points out that a budgeting system designed to
assist management may become an instrument which is related to functional and/or
dysfunctional behavioral consequences. Schiff and Lewin (1968) refer to 'unintended'
behavioral results, such as lower level management circumventing the budget and
allocating resources to what they perceive as justifiable purposes. Swieringa and Moncur
(1972, p. 194) summarize the relationship between budgets and those who are involved in
the budgeting process as follows:
".. .human behavior has implications for budgeting and.. .budgeting has
implications for human behavior".
Cherrington and Cherrington (1973) state that it is not budgets per se, that have an effect
on people, but the positive and negative reinforcing consequences associated with
budgets. That is, it is not the numbers that form the budget that have behavioral effects
on participants, but rather the intentions behind the numbers, the intentions that are read
into the numbers by participants, personalities of parties involved, organizational
structure and so on.
Research on both 'intended' and 'unintended' effects stemming from the budgeting
process has been extensive and diverse and has examined many of the possible influences
noted above (Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Schiff & Lewin, 1968; Cherrington & Cherrington,
1973; Onsi, 1973; Kenis, 1979; Kamin & Ronen, 1981; Brownell, 1982; Merchant, 1985;
Chenhall & Brownell, 1988; Lukka, 1988; Chow et al, 1988; Murray, 1990; Dunk, 1991;
Lai & Smith, 1992). The main focus of this research has been on the relationship
between participation and performance. This paper will focus on an important aspect of
this relationship - the propensity of managers' to create budgetary slack.
The propensity to create budgetary slack refers to a manager's tendency or inclination to
incorporate a 'buffer' into budgets. The propensity to create budgetary slack (PCBS) is
most commonly characterized as the inclination of managers' to set expense budgets
higher than the level of costs reasonably expected, so as to obtain a favorable variance
result. The same concept applies to revenue budgets, where the inclination is to propose
an inflow that is lower than the estimated inflow, so as again to obtain a favorable actual
to budget result.
The purpose of this study is to develop and empirically test an explanatory framework of
managers' PCBS. This framework will incorporate both situational and personality
variables in attempting to explain what motivates managers' to want to incorporate slack
into budgets.
The impact of the PCBS on the relationship between participation and performance will
be discussed in the following section, highlighting the motivation for studying the PCBS
concept. The development of an explanatory framework for the PCBS will then follow,
leading to the proposition of seven empirically testable hypotheses. The next section
details the research method followed by presentation of results. Finally, implications of
results in light of the limitations of this study are discussed.
2. MOTIVATION:
The propensity of managers' to create budgetary slack can be seen to be an important
aspect of the relationshipbetween participation and performance. That is, if it is argued
that participation provides subordinates with the means to create slack, then budgetary
slack may be an outcome of participativebudgeting, particularly if a manager has a high
propensity to create budgetary slack. If performance is measured in such a way that
favorable variances resulting from the inclusion of slack are incorporated into the
outcome measure, then this measure of performance may be seen to be biased in that it
does not reflect the true level of performance. Thus, the propensity to create budgetary
slack may impact on the associationbetween participation and performance, whereby a
high performance outcome may not be the result of positive effectsof participation
directly increasing the level of performance, as concluded in many studies (Milani, 1975;
Abdel-Halim & Rowland, 1976; Kenis, 1979; Brownell, 1981; Merchant, 1981;
Brownell, 1982; Tiller, 1983; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Mclnnes, 1986; Erez
& Arad, 1986; Licata et al, 1986; Cbenball & Brownell, 1988; Murray, 1990; Brownell &
Dunk, 1991; Frucot & Shearon, 1991). Rather high performance levels may be the result
of participationproviding the means by which the final performance outcome can be
biased in favor of the manager responsible for setting that budget.
Taking accountof the above analysis, it is arguedthat if the measures of performance
used in these studies incorporate any effects of budgetary slack, then the conclusions
reached in these studies with regard to the participation-performance relationship must be
interpreted with care. Self measures of performance have been used in many of these
studies (Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Mclnnes, 1986; Chenhall
& Brownell, 1988; Brownell & Dunk, 1991), and while there is no evidence as to bias in
self-ratings, it cannot be denied that there is a risk that subjects who have obtained
favorable variances as the result of incorporating slack may rate their performance as high
on the basis of these variances (even with the knowledge of how the variances were
obtained). Brownell (1982) refers to the problematic nature of self-ratings of
performance, particularly with regard to subjectivity and possibility of attributional biases
being incorporated into the ratings.
Cherrington and Cherrington (1973) found that under conditions of high participation, in
an experimental situation, performance was clearly superior when rewards were linked to
budget achievement. Results such as these should be viewed with care, as noted above,
as the performance evaluation/rewards process has led to an outcome that may be the
result of managers 'working the system' by utilizing budgetary slack, rather than simply
performing better. This may certainly be the case in the Cherrington and Cherrington
study, with performance measured in terms of departure from budget, where positive
variance from budget suggests a high performance level.
Mixed results on the association between participation and performance found in various
studies do suggest that either there are important variables absent from the analysis and/or
that one or more of the measurement instruments are not valid. It is not claimed here that
budgetary slack may be biasing the self-ratings of performance in all of these studies,
simply that the implications of the above analysis cannot be ignored and that further study
of the PCBS concept is necessary to shed further light on the issues raised above.
The concept of 'budgetary slack', as distinguished from the concept of 'propensity to
create budgetary slack', is used in the above analysis for the purpose of providing an
illustration of the potential implications where there is both a propensity to create slack
and there is available the means to incorporate slack, via participation in the budgeting
process. That is, by understanding the far-reaching consequences when the motivationor
propensity to create slack is combined with an opportunity to directly access the
budgeting process, the importanceof first understanding what motivates managers' to
incorporate slack is highlighted.
Budgetary slack (the outcome where there is a PCBS and an opportunity to access the
budgeting process) represents a potentially negative byproductof the budgeting process
(Wright, 1994). According to Kamin and Ronen (1981) budgetary slack behavior points
to failures in the organization design that may lead to inefficient allocation of resources
and to inferior profit performance. The negative effects of budgetary slack appear to be
most obvious in resource allocation based on budgeted figures and performance
evaluation based on budget to actual variances. According to Wright (1994, p.l) the
incorporation of budgetary slack into expense budgets suggests a demand for unwarranted
additional resources, particularly in situations where the given target is based on a
standard estimate of the time it should take to do a job. The result is both an inaccurate
and inefficient resource allocation process which must ultimately impact on performance
of the organization. Accuracy of a performance evaluation system that emphasizes
budget outcome will also be questionable where budgetary slack is utilized by managers'.
Kamin and Ronen (1981, p.484) believe that the biases embedded in the observed, post-
smoothed income, as a result of smoothing attempts, render the evaluation process
inefficient in that reward and punishment would be contingent not on actual performance
but on the basis of measures that have been subjected to "cosmetic" adjustment.
According to Onsi (1973) an evaluation of the effectiveness of a firm's control system
requires the identification of the nature of its budgetary slack, the behavioral factors that
influence slack build-up and utilization, and the motivational forces that lead to this
managerial behavior. Onsi asserts that budgetary slack is not necessarily undesirableper
se. Budgetary slackcan act as a mechanism that stabilizes responses in a wide variety of
environmental conditions. According to Kamin and Ronen (1981, p.473) budgetary slack
serves as a stabilizing mechanism when it is absorbed and released promptly due to
economic conditions under which the firm operates. However, budgets can become
dysfunctional when they motivate asymmetry between the absorption and release of slack
resources. This asymmetry may occur when managers' are unwilling to adjust the
personal benefits obtained from slack downwards. If slackresources are distributed
during periods of benign economic conditions but are not redistributed in periods of
adversity, the result will be misallocation of resources (Kamin and Ronen, 1981, p.473).
In light of the above arguments, the investigation of whatcauses managers to create slack
may then become more focused on the control of slack, as opposed to the elimination of
slack. Lukka (1988) believes that organizations will be able to use their resources more
effectively if they can identify why, in what situations, and how, budgetary slack is
created in organizations. Kamin and Ronen (1981, p.473) identify three important
reasons for detecting budgetary slack: the first is to set the right budget and reduce
incorrect extrapolations, the second is to motivate managers' and the third is to identify
failures in organizational design which are manifested in the budget.
Evidence suggests that budgetary slack is prevalent in organizations. Schiff and Lewin
(1968) concluded that slack may account for as much as 20 to 25 per cent of divisional
budgeted operating expenses in three of Fortune's ICQ largest corporations. Onsi (1973)
conducted personal interviews with 32 managers and found that 80% were willing to state
explicitly that they bargained for slack in their operating budgets.
This illustrates the necessity of and motivation for developing a framework which
explains the process by which participative budgeting can lead to a biased performance
outcome or alternatively an unbiased performance outcome. The first step in this process
is to develop and empirically test an integrative model of the participative budgeting-
PCBS relationship that describes the combined effect of variables that are relevant in
determining whether a manager will have a high inclination to create slack or a low
inclination to create slack.
Conflicting results on what causes managers' propensities to create budgetary slack
(PCBS) and on the outcome - budgetary slack - provides an additional motivation for
developing and testing a framework that explains which variables may be motivating
managers' to utilize slack during the budgeting process. Many of these conflicting results
together with a summary of the variety of approaches taken in studying the PCBS and
budgetary slack concepts are discussed below.
Lowe & Shaw (1968) conducted a case study of the annual budgeting process within a
large retail chain, and provided anecdotal evidence supporting an association between a
reward system that emphasizes budget outcome and managers' propensities to bias the
budget in their own personal favor.
Merchant (1985) investigated the association between participation, importance placed on
budgets, superiors ability to detect slack and predictability in the production process, on
the propensity of managers' to create slack. Results from a survey questionnaire support
a statistically significant negative relationship between participation and budgetary slack
and superiors' ability to detect slack and budgetary slack. A significant positive
relationship between "reactions to expected budget overruns" (one measure of the
importance of the 'meeting budget' variable) and the propensity to create budgetary slack
was also found. Only weak support was found for the hypothesized negative association
between predictability in the production process and PCBS. Lai and Smith (1992)
replicated this study using New Zealand data and found similar results.
Chow et al (1988) investigated the effects of a truth-inducing pay scheme and information
asymmetry on budgetary slack and performance. Results showed that where information
asymmetry was absent, slack did not differ significantly between pay schemes. Where
information asymmetry was present, slack was significantly lower under a truth-inducing
scheme.
Dunk (1991) empirically investigated the moderating effect of budgetary slack on
relationship between task uncertainty and subunit performance. Results supported the
positive effect of budgetary slack in reducing negative effects of task difficulty on
performance, but did not support any effect on task variability. Dunk (1993) investigated
whether interaction between budgetary participation, information asymmetry and budget
emphasis affects budgetary slack. Results from a survey questionnaire indicate that the
three independent variables do interact to affect slack, with slack found to be lowest when
all three variables are high, and highest when all three variables are low.
Nouri (1994) investigated the interactive effect of two motivational variables:
organizational commitment and job involvement, on managers PCBS. Results of a
survey questionnaire indicate that for highly committed managers', job involvement is
associated with a decreased PCBS. For managers' who are not highly committed, job
involvement is associated with an increased PCBS.
The studies summarized above do not represent an exhaustive list, but provide an
illustration of the diverse approaches taken and diverse results found from studying the
concept of managers' PCBS and the outcome - budgetary slack. The diversity of study
approaches and results provide an importantmotivation for developing and testing a
framework that attempts to shed light on many of these prior conflicting results.
With the above motivations in mind, the interaction between three variables resulting in
some level of propensity to create budgetary slack will be studied here. The three
variables that are hypothesized to interact in determining a manager's PCBS include
participation in the budgeting process, interpersonal trust and goal commitment.
Much prior research on managers PCBS has investigated the role of participation by
managers in the budgeting process (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Schiff and Lewin, 1968; Onsi,
1973; Kenis, 1979; Merchant, 1985; Lai and Smith, 1992). Results on the relationship
between participation and managers PCBS have been mixed. Onsi (1973), Kenis (1979),
Merchant (1985) and Lai and Smith (1992) found a negative relationship between
participation and PCBS, where managers who participated in the budgeting process had a
lower propensity to create slack than managers who did not participate in the budgeting
process. Contrary to this, results from interviews conducted with managers from three
independent divisions chosen from Fortune's 100 largest corporations by Schiff and
Lewin (1968) led them to conclude that participation in the budgeting process is
positively related to managers PCBS. The extent of evidence to date on the relationship
between participation and managers PCBS and the contradictory nature of this evidence
highlights the importance of incorporating the variable of participation into any study that
attempts to explain what motivates managers to want to create slack.
Trust is defined here in terms of a subordinate's confidence in the superior's motives and
intentions with respect to matters relevant to the subordinate's career and status in the
organization (Read, 1962, p.8). This can be linked to the budgeting process, where
situations of high trust would be characterized by subordinates' having confidence in
superiors use of budget information, particularly budget variances. That is, the
subordinate has confidence that the superior will not deliberately use unfavorable results
to the detriment of the subordinate's career and status within the organization. Blakeney
(1986, p.96) describes a high trust situation as one where subordinates' trust superiors' to
respond to unfavorable information and to requests for information as Adult problems to
be solved and not to respond as Critical Parents seeking to punish and blame. Distrust is
defined as the feeling that another's intentions and motives are not always what he says
they are, that he is insincere or has ulterior motives (Mellinger, 1956, p.304).
Ross (1994) investigated the role of trust in an accounting context, hypothesizing that
trust acts as a moderator on the effect of performance evaluation style on the level of job
related tension experienced by organizational members. Ross theorizes that trust
moderates this relationship by improving acceptance by the manager of the performance
evaluation process. Three categories of performance evaluation style: the budget
constrained style, the profit conscious style and the nonaccounting style, were considered
in this study. Results from the study provided evidence that the effect of the style of
performance evaluation on job related tension differs according to the level of trust held
by subordinates' for their superiors' (p.9). The use of a budget constrained performance
evaluation style or a profit conscious performance evaluation style where a relationship
characterized by high trust exists, leads to lower levels of job related tension than use of a
nonaccounting evaluation style. The results of this study have irnportant implications for
both managers' and researchers by providing support for the role of trust in organizational
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activities. Information on the role of trust in organizational activities is further extended
here by investigating the impact of interpersonal trust on managers' behavior in the
organizational budgeting process.
Prior research has supported the importance of the role of goal commitment in the
budgeting process (Coch andFrench, 1948; Argyris, 1953; Searfoss andMonczka, 1973;
Latham and Yukl, 1975; Brownell, 1982; Erez and Arad, 1986; Hollenbeck and Klein,
1987; Murray, 1990). In particular Onsi (1973) andKenis (1979) refer to participative
managers as having greater commitment tobudget goals and being less likely to
manipulate budgets for personal reasons. Nouri (1994) investigated the association
between goal commitment and PCBS, finding that managers who are highly committed to
organizational goals and having high jobinvolvement exhibited a decreased propensity to
create slack. These results support the importance of the variable of goal commitment in
explaining why managers have a propensity to create slack in the budgeting process.
The theoretical association between participation, interpersonal trust, goal commitment
and PCBS will be discussed in detail in the following section.
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT:
3.1 The Association Between Trust and Participation:
Information on the role of trust in organizational activities is extended here by
considering the effects of trust on participation in the budgeting process. When a
subordinate has a high level of trust in the way in which a superior will deal with
unfavorable variances, it is hypothesized that the subordinate will be more willing to take
on the responsibility of participating fully in thebudgeting process. Subordinates' who
have little trust in the way in which superiors will deal with unfavorable variances, are
more likely to want to avoid direct involvement, perceived or real, in the budget-setting
process. In this way, a subordinate manager is able to ensure thatduring the performance
evaluation process, no responsibility for variances frombudgetcanbe attributed to that
particular manager. This avoidance behavior is a defensive reaction to therisk that the
subordinate managermay leave himself/herself open to criticismand to loss of stature
within the organization. The easiestway for a subordinate manager to deal with the risk
of criticism or lack of stature within the organization is to avoid any involvement to begin
with.
According to Mellinger (1990, p.304) situations of distrust may be characterized by
anxiety on the part of the subordinate manager. In this situation, the subordinate manager
is highly likely to react in a defensive mannerin an attempt to minimize his or her
anxiety. Mellinger refers to particular defensive reactions that a manager may undertake
in response to this anxiety. Of particularinterest here are reactions involving withdrawal
and compliance. Withdrawal reactions involveunwillingness on the part of the
subordinate manager to provide insight into his or her attitudes on a particular matter.
Compliance reactions involve the managerattempting to minimize any disparity between
his or her attitudes and the superior managers attitude(s). Withdrawal reactions can be
linked to the hypothesis offered here, in that subordinate managers who distrust their
superiors will not willingly participate in the budgeting process, as this would involve
providing insights into their attitudes on certain matters. Compliancereactions will be
more obvious when dealing with situations of pseudo participation (as discussed below).
12
In situations where participative budgeting is part of a manager's contract, the effect of
trust will be most clearly seen in a distinction between true participation and pseudo-
participation. A subordinatemanager whohas a low level of trust in his/hersuperior, but
is required to participate in the budgeting process as a part of an employment contract,
maybe more likely to actively seekout and implement a superior's suggestions than to
attempt to implement his or her ownestimates. This is clearly a compliance reaction
designed to reduce the subordinate manager's anxiety causedby being required to
participate while not trusting the superior manager's intentions. In this case, a
subordinate manager is able to rationalize that they were not directly involved in the
estimation process, and therefore attach noego-involvement or personal responsibility for
that goal, thereby reducing any anxiety that they may be held responsible for the goals.
In this study, it is possible to investigate the relationship between trust and true
participation without having to allow for thecompounding effects of pseudo-
participation. That is, the instrument usedhere to measure participation, as developedby
Merchant (1981) has been shown to be an effective measure of true participation, as
evidenced by the high cronbach alphas reportedby Merchant (1981) and Lai and Smith
(1992). These alpha values are reported in section 4.2 of this paper.
The instrument used to measure participation includes questions such as 'New budgets
include changes that I have suggested'. This question is the key in distinguishing pseudo-
participation from true participation - as participants who are willingly involved in the
budget setting process and who have fully participated that will answer positively to this
question to satisfy their ego. Those avoiding ego-involvement in the budgeting process
will answer in the negative to this question as they would have no wish to claim
responsibility for any part of the budget. Where true participation is defined as willing
and full participation in the budgeting process, the instrument used here will be a reliable
measure of this - as those who are required to participate but manage to avoid this, will be
classified as non-participants. It may be argued that the participation instrument used
here simply 'masks' pseudo-participation. This may well be correct, however for the
purpose of this study true participation (according to the above definition) is the variable
under consideration, and as long as there are no compounding effects here from pseudo
participation, this variable is not part of the analysis.
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Hypothesis One may be stated as follows:
A positive and significant relationship is hypothesized between trust and
participation, where a manager who trusts his or her superior will be more
likely to participate fully in the budgeting process than a manager who has
little trust in his or her superior
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3.2 The Relationship Between Participation and Goal Commitment:
Kenis (1979, p.709) defines budgetary participation as the extent to which managers'
participate in preparing the budget and influence the budget goals of their responsibility
centers. Employee participation in the budget-setting process has been widely studied,
and it is thought to have both attitudinal and behavioral consequences (Murray, 1990,
p. 104).
The variable of commitment is associated with the 'strength of intention' construct
according to Tubbs [1993]. Strength of intention indicates the amount of personal
resources a manager is willing to apply to a particular task. The higher a person's
commitment to a task, the higher the level of resources a person will be willing to put into
working toward that task.
The positive impact of employee participation has been documentedin prior studies.
Argyris (1953, p.108-109) concluded that goals are more often accepted if individual
members can come together in a group and freely discuss opinions conceming goals and
take part in defining the steps by which the goals will beaccomplished. Locke (1968,
p.185) argued that "the most direct effect of participation is probably to commit the
subject to the decision reached".
Coch and French (1948) undertook a study of behavioral reactions to change in a pajama
factory and found that employees who participated or who were represented in a group
meeting to discuss the need for change, new job plans, and piece rates had a more
cooperative and permissive attitude toward making the change than those not represented.
As concluded by the authors, people tend to support what they help to create.
Brez and Arad (1986) tested and found a positive relationship between participation and
goal commitment, leading to increased performance. According to these authors, the
motivational factor of involvement in goal setting significantly affected both performance
quantity and quality, and work attitudes.
Hollenbeck and Klein (1987) believe that participation affects goal commitment through
the level of freedom one has in setting goals. The amount of participation a subordinate
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is allowed in the budgeting process will determine to a great degree the amount of
freedom a manager has in setting goals. When a subordinate manager has freedom in
setting organizational goals and participates in this process willingly, then he or she will
be held responsible for those goals by the organization and will as a result internalize a
sense of responsibility for those goals. This is supported by Becker and Green (1962,
p.397) who state that "if participation has been successful then these proposed levels ...
are accepted as goals by the participants".
Hanson (1966) believes that the act of becoming involved in budget creation enables
individuals to associate more closely with budget goals and to identify more closely with
organizational goals. Lowin (1968) refers to the contribution of participation to the
intemalization of organizational goals by organizational members.
When a manager has internalized a sense of responsibility for organizationalgoals that he
or she has set, then they are more likely to feel committed towards those goals - both in
the sense of setting accurate, viable goals and in meeting the budgeted figures. Where a
manager willingly and enthusiastically participates in goal setting and has internalized a
sense of responsibility for organizational goals, there will exist a sense of 'ownership' of
goals on the part of the manager. Where a manager feels responsible for creating goals
and feels a sense of ownership for these goals, then he or she will feel committed to
meeting or even exceeding those goals. This is supported by Searfoss and Monczka
(1973) found support for the hypothesis that greater involvement in the decision-making
processes will result in greater personalcommitment to the organization and its goals.
Latham and Yukl (1975) studied independent logging crews and found that the
participative goal setting group yielded higher performance and more frequent goal
attainment than the groups in the assigned goal condition.
Contrary to this, a number of studies by Latham have failed to find a relationship between
participation and goal commitment. Locke (1981) has noted that these particular studies
have been characterized by a number of methodological shortcomings.
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Based on results from prior studies, Hypothesis Two is offered for testing:
It is hypothesized that there will he a significant and positive relationship
between participation and goal commitment, where individuals who have a
high level of participation in the budgeting process, will be more committed
to budget goals than individuals who have a low level of participation in the
budgeting process.
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3.3 The Impact of Trust on Goal Committment:
It is hypothesized here that trust has a significant and positive effect on managers' goal
commitment. If subordinate managers' have a high level of trust in their superiors, then
for them there will be less of a tradeoff to be made between personal goals (favorable
performance evaluation via favorable budget variances) and organizational goals. Schiff
and Lewin (1968, p.51) refer to managers' motivation to achieve two sets of goals - the
firms goals and their personal goals. Personal goals are seen to be directly related to
income, size of staff and control over allocatiori of resources.
A manager who believes that his or her superior will rely heavily on unfavorable budget
variances in the performance evaluation process and may use these variances in a
negative way, is more likely to have a greater personal commitment to exposing
themselves in the best possible light than a manager who has a high level of trust in the
way in which a superior will deal with unfavorable variances. In a situation of high trust,
a manager is more able to develop a clear commitment to budget/organizational goals
without being hampered by a competing commitment to personal goals that ultimately
undermine the effectiveness of information that flows upward through the organization.
Evidence of such dysfunctional outcomes where a subordinate manager does not trust a
superior manager has been provided by Ross (1994) who found that trust reduces job
related tension where a budget constrained or profit conscious performance evaluation
style is used, where job related tension is seen as a surrogate for dysfunctional behavior.
As noted by Ross (1994, p.629) if job related tension is reduced then the propensity for
organizational members to engage in dysfunctional behavior will also decline.
Kamin and Ronen (1981) refer to any tradeoff to be made between personal and
organizational goals as lack of goal congruence. These authors refer to one possible
manifestation of lack of goal congruence as the creation of budgetary slack. In a situation
of low trust, there is an obvious lack of goal congruence. As discussed above, a manager
who has little trust in his/her superior will have a commitment to personal goals that may
involve achieving favorable actual to budget results to 'protect' oneself from intentions of
superiors. Organizational goals may involve concepts such as effective and efficient
allocation of resources and accurate flow of information. There is an obvious lack of
congruence between these personal goals and the organizational goals. Where such a
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discrepancy between personal goals and the organizational goals exists, and where
managers are motivated to fulfill personal goals (as in situations of low trust) it will be
highly unlikely that subordinate managers will developany commitment to organizational
goals.
Hofstede (1967) investigated the effects on managerial motivation of various control
aspects of the budgeting process. Oneof the major findings of this study was that the
manner in which superior managers handledbudget problems and the extent to which
they discussed budget results with subordinate managers had a strong impact on the
subordinate's attitudes about the budget system and his/her perception of the relevancy
of budget standards to his/herjob. The way in which superior managers handle budget
problems anddiscuss results with subordinate managers will affect the level of trust that a
subordinate has in a superior. If a superiormanagerdoes not handle budget problems
well in the eyes of a subordinate and/or is not willing to discuss budget results openly
with a subordinate, then that subordinate manager is unlikely to have a high level of trust
in the superior with regard to budgeting matters. Where superiors do not handle budget
problems well and as a result subordinate managers do not have a positiveattitude about
the budgeting process and/or the relevancy of organizational budgets to their position,
then commitment to budget goals is highly unlikely.
Murray (1990) refers to the effect of leadership style and participation on goal
commitment, where leadership style is defined as the amount of concern a superior will
have for a subordinate's thoughts and feelings. This can be linked to the variable of trust,
as a superior who shows a great deal of consideration for a subordinate's thoughts and
feelings will engender a higher level of trust from that subordinate manager. Greater
consideration by the superior will increase a subordinate's confidence in a superior's
motives and intentions with respect to matters that are relevant to the subordinate's career
and status within the organization. Murray (1990, p.l 15) states:
"If a leader does not exhibit an amount of consideration so that participation
is viewed as genuine, subordinates may not feel as though they have made a
contribution. The associated lack of ego involvement may inhibit goal
commitment".
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In this paper the relationship between a subordinate manager's trust in a superior and that
subordinate's commitment to the budget goals for which they are responsible is reflected
in Hypothesis Three offered for testing:
Where a subordinate manager has a high level of trust in a superior, the
subordinate's commitment to the organizational goals will be higher than for
a manager with a low level of trust in superiors.
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3.4 The Relationship Between Participation and the Propensity to Create Slack:
As noted earlier, there exists much contradictory evidence as to the consequences of
participation, in particular on the effect of participation on performance and on the PCBS.
For example, Onsi (1973) and Kenis (1979) found that participation in budget-setting
reduced the need for managers to create slack, as participative managers were seen to
become more committed to achieving budget goals and therefore would be less likely to
manipulate the budget for personal reasons. Merchant (1985) hypothesized and found
that participation in the budgeting process would result in managers being more
motivated to reach budget goals and having more positive attitudes toward budgets. Lai
and Smith (1992, p.2) subsequently hypothesized that participative budgeting leads to
positive communication with managers becoming more committed to budget targets and
feeling an absence of pressure to create slack. A negative association between
participation and PCBS was reported by Lai & Smith, although only significant at the
10% level.
Contrary to the above evidence, Lowe and Shaw (1968) and Schiff and Lewin (1970)
found that participation provides the means by which subordinate managers can
incorporate slack into budgets, thus where participative budgeting was in place managers
would be more likely to incorporate slack into organizational goals. Young (1985) also
hypothesized that subordinates who participate in the budgeting process will build slack
into the budget, as participation provides the means for managers to utilize slack. Young
found a positive and significant relationship between participation and budgetary slack.
It is proposed here that the participation-PCBS relationship is much more complex than a
simple direct impact of participation on a manager's PCBS as previously proposed. The
prior mixed results on this relationship provide support for the proposition that there is a
complex interrelationship of many variables that will result in some level of PCBS.
While it is not possible for this study to investigate all variables that may impact on the
inclination of a manager to create slack, it is possible to study the interactive effect of a
manageable number of variables that would seem likely to affect directly or indirectly the
PCBS factor.
The path model represented below (Path Diagram 1) suggests both a direct effect of
participation on managers' propensities to create budgetary slack and an indirect effect
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through the variable of goal commitment. It is hypothesized here that the link between
participation and PCBS occurs through the intervening variable of goal commitment, as
opposed to a direct effect of participation on PCBS. As noted by Murray (1990, p.110):
"Whether participation actually does result in more difficult goals is likely
to be situation or organization specific".
In his 1990 paper, Murray (p.113) explicitly recognizes that participation does not have a
direct, unmediated effect on performance (or some measured outcome). Murray proposes
a framework in which participation affects performance through a number of mediating
and intervening variables. Chenhall and Brownell (1988,p.226) also propose such a
framework for the participation-outcome relationship:
".. .the effects of participation, if any, are indirect and are conveyed to outcome
criteria via some intervening construct which links the variables".
Support is therefore offered for a more complex indirect relationship between
participation and managers PCBS than previously hypothesized (Onsi, 1973; Kenis,
1979; Merchant, 1985; Lai and Smith, 1992).
In this study, a less complex model than that proposed by Murray is suggested, in which
participation is hypothesized to have a significant indirect impact on PCBS (a measured
outcome) through the variable of goal commitment.
The direct relationship between participation to PCBS is expected to be non-significant,
while the indirect relationship between participation and PCBS through goal commitment
is expected to be larger and statistically significant. This is supported by reference to the
theory developed in the above studies (Merchant, 1985; Lai & Smith, 1992) which refer
to participation reducing PCBS through an effect on subordinate managers' commitment.
As noted above, the mixed results obtained from investigating a direct participation -
PCBS relationship also provides support for this hypothesis
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Hypothesis Four may be stated as follow:
It is hypothesized that participation will have a statistically signiflcant effect on the
variable of PCBS through the intervening variable of goal commitment, while the
direct effect of participation on PCBS is expected to be non-significant.
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3.5 The Effect of Interpersonal Trust on the Propensity to Create Slack:
It is hypothesized here that interpersonal trust will directly and significantly impact on the
propensity of subordinate managers' to create budgetary slack. If a subordinate manager
has a high level of trust in the way in which a superior will deal with unfavorable
variances, it is hypothesized that the lower-level manager is less likely to need to
incorporate slack into budgets. On the other hand, if subordinate managers' have little
trust that superiors' will not focus on unfavorable budget variances, then it is
hypothesized that lower-level management will have a higher propensity to create slack
as a means of ensuring that there are no unfavorable variances for upper-level
management to be concemed with.
The impact of interpersonal trust on the accuracy of information provided by lower-level
managers' to superiors' has been documented in prior studies. Mellinger (1956, p.304)
comments:
"...the primary goal of communication with a distrusted person becomes the
reduction of one's own anxiety, rather than the accurate transmission of ideas".
Results of a case study within a large govemment department, involving interviews,
review of documents and observation, led to the following conclusion from Mellinger
(p.307):
"These findings support the theory that if B is motivated to communicate with A,
and if B distrusts A, then he will communicate in such a way as to conceal from
A information about his own attitudes towards issue X."
Read (1962) hypothesized that a subordinate's trust in his/her superior's motives and
intentions modifies the relationship between mobility of orgariizational members and
accuracy of information. A high level of trust is seen to lead to more accurate
information being communicated to the superior, and a low level of trust is seen to lead to
less accurate information being transferred for highly mobile individuals. Results of both
a survey and interviews are summarized by Read as follows:
"Analysis of results indicates that the relationship between mobility need and
accuracy of upward communication was strikingly modified by the interpersonal
trust condition..." (p. 10)
24
The results were in the expected direction, where less accurate communication was found
in the low trust condition. Read concludes:
"... unilateral subordinate-superior trust appears to have the greatest single
effect upon accuracy of communication" (p.10).
Blakeney (1986) develops a transactional view of trust with regard to organizational
communication and refers to trust as "a key variable in the organizational climate because
it influences the transformation of information" (Roberts & O'Reilly, 1974b, and O'Reilly
& Roberts, 1974, as quoted by Blakeney, 1986p.95). Blakeney refers to situations of low
trust being characterizedby subordinates communicating only favorable information to
superiors, whetherit is important or not. Situations of high trust are characterized by the
communication of important information, whether favorable or not.
The empirical and anecdotal evidence on the effects of interpersonal trust on accuracy of
information communication can be logically linked to the negative relationship
hypothesized here between trust and PCBS (Hypothesis Five). That is, budgetary slack is
a clear example of inaccurate information communication between subordinates and
superiors, where the subordinate conceals fromthe superior his or her true estimate with
regard to the budget. When trust is characterized as how subordinatesdiscern the use of
information communicated to the superior in performance evaluation, then it can be
concluded that in situations of high trust, subordinate managers are less likely to
introduce slack into budgets as they have little need to do so, that is, information that is
important will be communicated whether favorable or not (Blakeney, 1986). This
conclusion can be further supported by referring to the result found by Onsi (1973) that
managers create slack for two reasons, one being pressure by top management to attain or
exceed budgeted figures. Following from this, if subordinates are confident that
managers will not focus only on unfavorable variances in performance evaluation, then
pressure to meet or exceed budget will be offset to some extent and there is less
motivation to incorporate slack into budgets as a means of coping with the situation. For
managers who are confident that upper-level management will focus mainly on
unfavorable variances in evaluating performance, pressure from superiors to meet or
exceed budget is likely to be intensified, increasing the motivation to incorporate slack
during the budgeting process. This is supported by Ross (1994) who found that trust
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moderates the relationship between performance evaluation style and job related tension,
where job related tension is seen as a surrogate for dysfunctional behavior.
Based on the above analysis. Hypothesis Five is offered for empirical testing:
As the level of trust that subordinates have in their superiors actions and
intentions increases, the propensity of subordinate managers to create slack
will decrease.
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3.6 The Relationship Between Commitment and The Propensity to Create
Budgetary Slack:
When commitment to reaching a goal is high, it is hypothesized that a subordinate's
PCBS will be low. That is, where a subordinate manager is willing to be held responsible
for setting goals, and has a high commitment to those goals and to the organization, he or
she is unlikely to have a high level of desire to 'fudge' the figures at the expense of the
organization. Where a manager is committed to organizational goals, it would be
contradictory for him or her to set loose budget go^s, in terms of putting their own
personal interests ahead of organizational goals. The notion of goal commitment is itself
completely contradictory to managers' having an inclination to incorporate slack into
budgets. As noted earlier, goal commitment is associated with the strength of intention
construct, whereby the higher the level of commitment a manager has to a goal, the
greater amount of personal time and resources that manager will devote to meeting that
goal. The notion of setting goals lower than realistically expected so as to obtain
favorable budget variances is opposed to the notion of managers' being committed to
organizational goals, and investing personal resources into meeting those goals.
This is supported by evidence from prior studies (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Erez & Arad,
1986) which suggests that in most cases where participative budgeting is in place, and is
received well by participants, goal commitment is increased and more difficult goals are
set than those in non-participative situations. The strength of intention construct is
therefore realized in terms of managers' investing personal resources by setting more
difficult goals. Murray (1990,p.l07) also recognizes the connection between goal
commitment and effort extended toward some outcome, with the following statement:
"If an individual becomes committed to a given goal, it will influence the
individual's actions and consequently performance".
Brownell (1982, p.143) refers to the effect of commitment on subordinates' budget
related behavior:
"For example, participation, by enhancing commitment to the budget by
subordinates [Searfoss and Monczka, 1973], may serve to improve the
intrinsic value to the individual of achieving the budget and at the same
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time enhance the probability that goal-directed effort will be successful".
As noted earlier, Onsi (1973) and Kenis (1979) described participative managers' as
becoming more committed to achieving budget goals and therefore less likely to
manipulate budgets for personal reasons. Nouri (1994) found that for managers' who are
highly committed to the organization's goals and values, job involvement is associated
with decreased propensity to create slack.
Where a manager attaches a high intrinsic value to the budget, he or she will be unlikely
to proposeestimates that clearly understate the expected input and output in order to
further their own personal gains. As statedearlier, the whole notion of budget slack is
contrary to goalcommitment as previous authors have described it (Searfoss & Monczka,
1973).
Hypothesis six, which describes the relationship between goalcommitment and PCBS is
offered for testing:
A manager who has a high goal commitment will he less likely to have a high
propensity to create budgetary slack than a manager with low goal
commitment.
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3.7 The Indirect Association Between Trust and Propensity to Create Slack:
The relationship between interpersonal trust and the propensity of subordinate managers
to create slack is hypothesized here to be both direct and indirect. The direct relationship
between trust and PCBS is reflected in hypothesis five offered above for testing. The
indirect relationship between trust and PCBS is hypothesized to occur through the
variable of goal commitment. The indirect relationship between trust and PCBS is
hypothesized here to be negative and highly significant, where a high level of trust is
hypothesized to increase goal commitment (as indicated in hypothesis three offered here
for testing), which in turn results in subordinate managers having a lower PCBS (as
indicated in hypothesis six offered here for testing). A low level of trust is predicted to
result in managers having a higher PCBS, through the impactof low trust in decreasing
goal commitment which in turn leads to an increase in managers propensity to create
slack.
Hypothesis seven, which summarizes this indirect relationship, is offered for testing:
It is hypothesized that trust will have a statistically signiflcant negative effect of
managers PCBS through the intervening variable of goal commitment.
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A diagram of the direct and indirect relationships between participation, trust, goal
commitment and managers' PCBS as hypothesized above is shown below in Path
Diagram 1:
Participation (1)
Goal Commitment (3) PCBS (4)
Trust (2)
PATH DIAGRAM 1.
The hypothesized causal relationships between the variables are indicatedby the
unidirectional arrows. The seven hypotheses offered here for testing are represented by
the six arrows in the above diagram.
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4.0. RESEARCH DESIGN:
4.1 Sample Selection:
A random sample of 100 firms was selected from the register of firms published in
Australian Public Companies Guide November 1996-March 1997. The sample was
selected from this Public Companies Guide, as the companies included in the guide were
thought to be large enough to support the number of levels of management needed to
obtain relevant and sufficient data for this study. The organizations were selected
randomly from a random numbers table. The sample number of 100 companies was
thought to be sufficient to provide the number of responses and amount of data necessary
to provide a wide range of values for the variables studied. The combination of random
selection, range of organizations from which data was obtained and the size of the sample
provide external validity to the results of this study.
A senior corporate official of each firm was contacted by telephone to explain the nature
of this study and to identify lower-level managers' who were actively involved in the
budgeting process. Questionnaires were then sent to these officials, who agreed to
distribute the surveys to the managers' identified. A total of 130 surveys were
distributed. Refer to the appendix for a draft copy of the questionnaire.
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4.2 Measures:
(a) Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack - This variable has been measured in prior
studies (Merchant, 1985; Lai & Smith, 1992; Wright, 1994) using the four-item
instrument developed by Onsi (1973). Cronbach alphas reported by Merchant and Lai
and Smith of 0.70 and 0.74 respectively indicate an acceptable level of reliability.
However, it is claimed here that this measure of Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack
may be flawed to some extent. The Onsi instrument (please refer to Appendix Two) is
seen to intuitively associate the motivation to create slack with the opportunity to do so,
in the form of participation in budgeting activities. In particular, the use of the word
'submit' in two of the four questions, suggests that the manager completing the
questionnaire has the power to submit budgets, which infers a fairly high level of
participation. The way the questions are phrased in this instrument assume that to have a
propensity to create slack, managers' must participate to some extent in the budget-setting
process.
As the relationship between participation and managers' PCBS is being investigated here,
it is essential that a measure of one variable does not have built into it assumptions about
the other variable included in the analysis. The limitations associated with Onsi's
measure do cast some doubt on the ability of this instrument to provide a 'true' measure of
propensity to create slack, separate from some measure of participation in the budgeting
process.
A modified version of the Onsi measure is included in the draft questionnaire (Appendix
One). The modifications made to the original instrument include replacing the word
'submit' with the word 'propose' so as to broaden the range of participation associated
with a managers propensity to create slack. That is, the word 'propose' covers an initial
and informal form of participation through to a more formal and involved level of
participation. The word 'submit', however, suggests a level of participation at least at
the point where a manager would formally submit budget estimates.
Another change to the Onsi PCBS instmment was in generalizing the application of the
questions so that they do not refer specifically to plant managers, but rather to all
managers.
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A cronbach alpha was calculated to test the level of reliability of this altered measure.
The alpha value for the PCBS instrument is .793, which is higher than the cronbach
alphas reported above for the original Onsi measure.
Responses to the questions weremeasured on a five point Likert scale, where the lowend
of the scale indicates a low propensity to create slack and the high end of the scale
indicates a high propensity to create slack.
(b) Participation - The level of participation in the budgeting process will be measured
using two scales developedby Merchant (1981) and used subsequently by Merchant
(1985) and Lai and Smith (1992). The first scale. Influence on Budget Plans, is a two-
item instrument, while the second scale. Personal Involvement in Budgeting, is a three-
item instrument. The cronbach alphas reported by Merchant (1985) were 0.52 for the first
scale and 0.60 for the second scale. Lai and Smith (1992) reported cronbach alphas of
0.72 and 0.79 respectively. The cronbach alphas calculated here for these measures are
0.7547 and 0.8616 respectively. These cronbach alphas, particularly those reported by
Lai and Smith are quite acceptable.
(c) Goal Commitment:
The level of goal commitment will be measured using the instrument developed by
Hollenbeck et al [1989]. The instrument consists of seven questions that require
responses on a five item Likert scale. Five of the questions (question two through to
question six) are reverse scored on completion. In this way, a high score on this
instrument represents a high goal commitment and vice versa. A cronbach alpha of 0.88
has been reported for this measure by Hollenbeck et al. The cronbach alpha calculated
here for the goal commitment instrument is 0.8514. The high cronbach alpha reported for
this measure suggest a high level of reliability.
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(d) Trust:
The four item measure used here to measure the variable of trust was developed by Read
(1962) and was used by Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978) and Ross (1994). The cronbach
alpha coefficient measured for this instrument was 0.81. The cronbach alpha measured
here for the trust instrument is 0.8754. Responses to the four items are required on a five
point Likert Scale, with the low end of the scale representing a low level of trust in
superior managers and the high end of the scale representing a high level of trust in
superior officers.
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4.3 Data Analysis:
Path analysis is the technique usedhere to test the following hypothesized relationships.
Path analysis is a methodfor studying patterns of causation among a set of variables
(Pedhazur, 1986). According to Mia [1987, p.550] this technique enables us to estimate
the direct relationships, the indirect relationships, the spurious relationships and the
unanalyzed relationships among the variables of interest.
The role of theory underlies the effective use of path analysis in investigating patternsof
causation between variables. According to Pedhazur (1986), path analysis cannot be
viewed as an effective method of analysis without strong theory to provide hypothesized
linkages between variables. The analysis itself has nomeaning without the theory. In
fact for the application of path analysis to be valid, the researcher must makehis or her
theoretical formulations explicit.
The analysis of the data is designed to shed light on the question of whether or not the
causal model is consistent with the data (Pedhazur, 1986, p.579). If the theoretical model
is consistent with the data, it does not constitute proof of the theory, but simply support
for it. If the model is inconsistent with the data then doubt exists as to the validity of the
theory that has generated it.
The assumptions that underlie path analysis as presented in this paper are: the relations
among variables in the model are linear, additive and causal, residuals are not correlated
with variables preceding them in the model, there is a one-way causal flow through the
model and variables are measured without error. The data obtained in this study will be
tested for these assumptions in the results section of this paper.
In a causal model, distinction must be made between exogenous and endogenous
variables. In this case, trust is the only exogenous variable to the model, as its variability
is determined by causes outside the model. Participation, goal commitment and PCBS
are endogenous variables as their variation is explained within the model proposed in this
paper. While in reality variation in participation, goal commitment and PCBS may be
explained by other variables not included in this study, we are only concerned with what
has been hypothesized here. Therefore, participation, goal commitment and PCBS are
endogenous variables according to the limits of the model proposed in this paper.
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The unidirectional arrows drawn between variables in Path Diagram 2 (below) represent
hypothesized causal relationships. As only one variable is exogenous, all hypothesized
relationships can be analyzed. Relationships between variables that are exogenous to the
path model remain unanalyzed. Each endogenous (dependent) variable in a causal model
may be represented by an equation consisting of the variables upon which it is assumed to
be dependent, and a term representing residuals, or variables not under consideration in
the given model (Pedhazur, p.583). The equations representing the endogenous variables
in the model proposed here are presented below.
The relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable
hypothesized as a cause of that dependentvariable, is describedby a path coefficient
represented as a p with two subscripts in the path diagram (refer Path Diagram 2 below)
and in the equations below. Path coefficients indicate the amount of expected change in
the dependent variable caused by a one unit change in the independent variable.
Participation (1)
Goal Commitment (3) p PCBS (4)
Trust (2) —— P42
PATH DIAGRAM 2.
Where all of the assumptions discussed above are met, the solution for the path
coefficients takes the form of an ordinary least squares solution for the P's - standardized
regression coefficients (Pedhazur, p.584). The major distinction between ordinary
regression analysis and path analysis, then, lies in the amount of decomposition of the
hypothesized relationships between variables. When applying ordinary regression
analysis in this case, for example, PCBS would be regressed in a single analysis on
Participation, Trust and Goal Commitment. In applying path analysis, three regression
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analyses are necessary to examine the decomposed relationships hypothesized here. As
noted above, path analysis also allows further decomposition of a correlation between an
exogenous and endogenous variable into a direct effect, indirect effect, spurious effect
and unanalyzed effect.
A direct effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is indicated by the path
coefficient from that variable to the dependent variable. An indirect effect can be
illustrated here by referring to the effect of trust on goal commitment through the variable
of participation (ie. PnPsi)- Part of the relationship between participation and goal
commitment can be termed as spurious, due to both variables sharing a common cause -
Trust. This spurious relationship can be indicated by P|2P32-
If the relationship between participation and trust was represented by a curved line with
arrowheads at both ends (indicating that both variables are exogenous and correlated),
then that part of the correlation between participation and goal commitment that is due to
correlation of participation with another cause of goal commitment (ie. trust) is left
unanalyzed. This is due to the inability to state the cause or causes for the correlation
between trust and participation, as in this case they would both be exogenous variables
with causes determined outside the model. The total effect of an independent variable on
a dependent variable is represented by the correlation coefficient.
Path analysis is used here for the purpose of studying the complex interrelationships
between three variables that are hypothesized to affect managers PCBS. The ability to
study patterns of causation between the variables, including decomposition into direct
effects, indirect effects and spurious effects provides valuable insights that would not be
possible with ordinary regression analysis. In a case such as this, where diframework of
causation is hypothesized, path analysis allows fuller understandingof what causes
managers to have a propensity to incorporate slack into budgets.
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The equations representing each of the endogenous variables in the model are shown
below with reference to the hypotheses to be tested:
Hypothesis One:
The effect of trust on participation is tested by the following equation:
X] = Pi2 X2+ PR
Where, Xi = participation
P12 = path coefficient from trust to participation
PR = standardized residuals
According to Hypothesis Two, Path 12 is expected to be positive and highly significant,
indicating the positive and significant impact of trust on the level of participation.
Hypotheses Two and Three:
Hypothesis two and three are testedby calculating equation number2 as follows:
X3 = P31X1 + P32X2 + PR
Hypothesis two proposes positive impact of participation on goal commitment. This will
be tested by the significance of path 31, which measures the direct path from participation
to goal commitment. Path 31 is hypothesized to be positive and significant, indicating
that greater participation in the budgeting process will lead to subordinate managers
having a higher goal commitment.
Hypothesis three proposes a positive impact of the variable trust on goal commitment.
This will be tested by the direction and significance of path 32, which measures the direct
path between trust and commitment. This path is expected to be positive and significant,
indicating that the higher the level of trust a subordinate has in a superior, the more likely
the subordinate will be committed to organizational goals, than when there exists a low
level of trust in upper-level management.
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Hypotheses Four. Five. Six and Seven:
The relationships proposed in hypotheses four, five, six and seven can be tested by
equation three as follows:
X4 = P41X1 + P42X2 + P31X1 + P32X2 + P43X3 + PR
The hypothesis that participation has a more significant indirect effect on PCBS through
the variable of goal commitment canbe tested by comparing the pathcoefficient P41 from
the above equation with the indirect pathP3iP43- Path41 is expected to be insignificant,
while the indirect Path 31/43 is expected to be significant.
Hypothesis five, which proposes a direct negative relationship between trust and a
manager's PCBS willbe tested by the direction and significance of path42. Thispath is
expected to be negative and significant, whereby a high level of trust is associated with a
manager having a low PCBS, anda low level of trust is associated with a higher level of
PCBS.
Hypothesis six, which proposes a negative andsignificant impact of goal commitment on
a manager's PCBS, will be tested by the direction and significance of Path 43. According
to Hypothesis Six, Path 43 is expected to be negative and significant where managers
who are highly committed to organizational goals will have a lower PCBS than managers
who are not committed to organizational goals.
Hypothesis seven, which proposes a significant indirectnegative relationship between
trust and PCBS, will be tested by the direction and significance of P32P43- Path 32/43 is
expected to be negative and significant, where a high level of trust will result in a high
goal commitment which in turn will result in managers having a lower PCBS.
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5.0 Results
Of the 130surveys distributed, 90 were returned. Three of these were incomplete and
were unable to be used and consequently had to be discarded. The usable response rate
was (87/130) 67% which is quite respectable for social research.
Theaverage period of employment of respondents in their current position was eight
years, with actual experience in the position forwhich they are employed ranging from
six months to twenty-five years. Respondents were drawn from a diverse rangeof
industries, fromengineering services, thebanking sector, the finance sector, retail
services and manufacturing. Details of the size of departments and organizations from
which respondents were drawn are provided below:
Number of Employees By Department and Organisation:
Number of Employees Department Organisation
Less than 10 24 2
10-19 25 2
20-49 20 6
50-99 6 11
100-199 5 10
200-499 4 12
500-999 1 12
More than 1000 2 32
The data from useable surveys was analyzed using the SPSS Statistical Package. Prior to
discussing the results of the regression analysis, theassumptions thatmustbe metby the
data will be considered. The assumptions that underlie path analysis, as previously
discussed, include normality, linearity, independence of residuals, and effects of outliers.
The data has been tested to ensure that all of these assumptions have been met and these
results are provided below.
Descriptive statistics for the four variables are presented below:
Descriptive Statistics:
Variable Mean Std Devn Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Partn 3.717 .850 1.2 5.0 -.8501 .2925
Trust 3.402 1.008 1.0 5.0 -.6788 -0.4631
GC 3.923 .772 1.8571 5.0 -1.2122 .6022
PCBS 2.537 1.009 1.0 4.75 .4045 -.7957
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As reported in the above table, the data does not suffer from excessive skewness or
kurtosis, supporting an assumption of normality. Normal plots of regression standardized
residuals for the dependent variables in each of the three regressions also indicated
relatively normal distributions. These plots were unable to be printed due to problems
with the SPSS program on the network at the Department of Accounting and Finance,
University of Tasmania.
The assumption of linearity is tested by referring to the scatterplots of residuals against
predicted values for each of the three regressions. These scatterplots show that there is a
clear linear relationship between the predicted values, consistent with the assumption of
linearity. A relatively random distribution of the residuals indicated by the scatterplots
supports the assumption of the independence of the residuals.
A test for outliers was conducted by requesting casewise plots for outlying cases with
standard deviations greater than three (3). There were no univariate outliers found.
With all assumptions underlying path analysis having been met by the data obtained for
this study, the details of the regression analyses can now be presented and discussed.
Both Pearson and Spearman correlation statistics for the data are presented below:
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Statistics:
PCBS Trust Partn GC
PCBS 1.000 -.439 -.371 -.688
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Trust -.439 1.000 .406 .638
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Partn -.371 .406 1.000 .540
(.000) (.000) (.000)
GC -.688 .638 .540 1.000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
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Spearman Rank Order Correlation Statistics:
PCBS Trust Partn GC
PCBS 1.000 -0.3034 -.2752 -.5525
(.002) (.005) (.000)
Trust -.3034 1.000 .3032 .4168
(.002) (.002) (.000)
Partn -.2752 .3032 1.000 .3822
(.005) (.002) (.000)
GC -.5525 .4168 .3822 1.000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
As predicted, all hypothesized links between variables are represented by strong
correlations as reported above. These correlation statistics represent the total effect of
one variable on another, as discussed earlier. The decomposition of these total effects
into direct effects, indirect effects, spurious effects and unanalyzed effects will be made
below. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients will be reported in the table
of decompositions.
Three linear regressions were run on the data to obtain path coefficients. The data
obtained from running these linear regressions are provided below:
Regression of Trust on Participation:
Variable P Standard
Error
t value SigniBcance
Trust .405683 .083574 4.092 .0001
The F value for the overall regression equation is 16.74506 with a significance level of
.0001.
Regression of Partn and Trust on Goal Commitment:
Variable P Standard
Error
t value Significance
Partn .336023 .076576 3.986 .0001
Trust .501588 .064554 5.950 .0000
The F Value for the overall regression equation is 42.21116 with a significance of .0000.
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Regression of Partn, Trust and GC on PCBS:
Variable P Standard
Error
t value significance
Partn .00001 .112800 .001 .9991
Trust -.00004 .103964 -.004 .9966
GC -.687976 .147388 -6.101 .0000
The F Value of the overall regression equation is 24.89349 with a significance of .0000.
The F values reported above show that overall the three regression equations are
statistically significant.
As noted earlier, the p's obtained using ordinary least squares analysis, represent the
direct path coefficients from an independent variable to a dependent variable. A
complete analysis of direct, indirect and spurious effects is provided in the table below.
Indirect and spurious path coefficients are obtained by multiplying path coefficients
between the variables under consideration. The total effect of one variable on another
consists of the direct path between the variables and also the sum of any indirect paths
from that variable to the other and the sum of any spurious effects resulting from the both
variables having a common cause. These path coefficients obtained from linear
regression analysis are presented in the table below:
Path Coefficients:
From: To: Symbol Direct Indirect Spurious Total
Trust Partn Pl2 .406 .406
(.000) (.000)
Partn GC P31 .336 .204 .540
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Trust GC P32 .502 .136 .638
(.0000) (.000) (.000)
Partn PCBS P41 .00011 -.231 -.140 .371
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Trust PCBS P42 -.00045 -.439 -.439
(.000) (.000)
GC PCBS P43 -.688 .688
(.0000) (.0000)
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The results of the analysis are shown below in Path Diagram 3 below:
Participation- 0.00011
0.406 0.502 Goal Commitment • PCBS
Trust- 0.00045
PATH DIAGRAM 3.
Directpaths are the (3 coefficients obtained from regression analysis. Indirectpaths are
calculated as the product of the hypothesized path - for example, the indirect path from
trust to goal commitment is calculated as the pathcoefficient fromtrust to participation
(0.406) multiplied by the path coefficient from participation to goal commitment(0.336)
giving a total indirect path coefficientof 0.136.
Spurious paths are calculated as the product of the paths from the variable hypothesized
as the common cause - for example, the spurious component of the participation-goal
commitment relationship is calculated as the path coefficient from trust (the common
cause) to participation (0.406) multipliedby the path coefficient from trust to goal
commitment (0.502) giving a spurious path coefficient of 0.204. This path coefficient
quantifies the effect of that part of the participation-goal commitment relationship which
is due to these variables having a common cause.
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Hypothesis One:
From the above table it can be seen that the direct path coefficient from trust to
participation is equal to the correlation coefficient between the two variables. This is the
result of participation being hypothesized as dependent on a single cause (trust) and a
residual.
Hypothesis one predicts a positive and significantdirect relationship between trust and
participation, where a subordinate whohas a high level of trust in a superior will
participate more fully in the budgeting process. A subordinate who does not have a high
level of trust in a superior manager is hypothesized to want to avoid participation in the
budgeting process.
This hypothesis is tested by referring to the direct pathbetween trust andparticipation -
Pi2. This path has a positive value of 0.406 and is highly significantat the 0.000 level as
expected.
The data supports the hypothesized positive relationship between trust and participation.
Hypothesis Two:
The total effect of participation on goal commitment can be represented by the following
equation:
ri3 = P31 + P12P32
DE SB
Hypothesis two predicts a positive relationship between participation and goal
commitment, where subordinate managers' who participate fully in the budgeting process
will have a higher commitment to the goals. This hypothesis is tested by referring to the
direct path coefficient from participation to goal commitment.
The path coefficient P31 is 0.336 and is significant at the 0.000 level. This supports a
positive and significant relationship between participation and goal commitment.
There is also a positive and significant spurious relationship between participation and
goal commitment, associated with the fact that both variables have a common cause -
Trust.
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Hypothesis Three:
The total effect of trust on goal commitment is represented as follows:
r23 = P32 + P12P31
DE IE
Hypothesis three refers to the positive impact of trust on a managers level of goal
commitment. Managers' with a high level of trust in superior officers are hypothesized to
be more committed to organizational goals than managers' who do not trust their superior
officers. This is tested by referring to P32 which is the direct path from trust to goal
commitment. From the above table, it can be seen that the value for this path is 0.502
with a significance level of 0.0000. This result provides very strong support for the
hypothesized relationship between trust and goal commitment.
It also interesting to note that trust has a significant indirect effect on goal commitment
through the variable of participation. This relationship is represented by a path
coefficient of 0.136 which is significant at the 0.000 level.
Hypothesis Four:
The correlation between participation and PCBS can be represented by the following
equation:
ri4 = P41 + P3]P43 + P12P32P43 + P12P42
DE IE SE SE
Hypothesis four predicted that participation would have a more significant indirect effect
on PCBS through goal commitment than a direct effect on PCBS. To test this hypothesis,
we must compare the path coefficient from participation to PCBS (P41) with the indirect
path coefficient through goal commitment (P31P43). The direct path coefficient (from the
above table) is 0.00011 and is not statistically significant. The indirect path through goal
commitment is -0.231 and is statistically significant at the .000 level. This negative
indirect path coefficient suggests that increased participation will indirectly reduce a
managers PCBS through its effect on goal commitment.
The data supports hypothesis four, where the indirect effect of participation on PCBS is
more significant than a direct effect of participation on managers' PCBS. It is only by
simultaneous assessment of participation's effect on goal commitment, and the latter's
effect on PCBS that we gain insight into participation's precise effects (Chenhall and
Brownell, 1988).
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Part of the correlation between participation and PCBS includes a spurious component,
which as reported above is statistically significant. This spurious component is due to the
common cause affecting the two variables (variable two - trust) and can be referred to as
the noncausal part of the correlation coefficient. This spurious component represents
'excess noise' resulting from the framework of hypothesized causal relationships. That
is, the combination of a number of hypothesized causal relationships within a framework
will result in "noise" from the number of causal effects between variables. These
spurious effects do not represent hypothesized causal relationships but are simply a
byproduct of the combination of a number causal relationships.
Hypothesis Five:
The correlation coefficient between trust and PCBS can be decomposed as follows:
r24 = P42 + P32P43 + P12P41 + P12P31P43
DE IE IE IE
Hypothesis five predicts a negative and highly significant relationship between trust and
PCBS, where a high level of trust between subordinate and superior managers' leads
directly to subordinate managers having a lower PCBS. This hypothesis is tested by
referring to the path coefficient P42.
The value for this path coefficient is -.00045 which is not statistically significant.
Hypothesis Five is not supported by the data.
The indirect effect of trust on PCBS is negative and significant -0.439 at the 0.000 level.
Therefore it appears that contrary to the theory developed earlier, a high level of trust in a
superior manager does not appear to directly cause a manager to have a low PCBS.
However, trust does appear to indirectly cause managers' to have lower PCBS, by its
effect on the variable of goal commitment.
Hypothesis Six:
This hypothesis predicts a negative and highly significant relationship between goal
commitment and PCBS, where a manager who is highly committed to organizational
goals will have a lower PCBS than a manager who is not highly committed. The value
for P43 has been calculated as -0.688 with a significance level of 0.0000.
The calculated path coefficient provides support for the hypothesis offered with regard to
the goal commitment - PCBS relationship.
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Hypothesis Seven:
As noted in the analysis of results for Hypothesis five, the results do support a significant
negative indirect relationship between trust and PCBS, through the variable of goal
commitment. The value for the P32P43 was calculated as -0.439 with a significance level
of 0.000.
The results do provide support for an indirect relationship between trust and managers
propensities to create slack.
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6.0 DISCUSSION:
The results obtained from statistical analysis of the survey data suggest that the model of
participative budgeting offered here for testing is generally consistent with the data. Six
hypotheses thatdescribe the causal relationships underlying this model were offered for
testing and five of the six hypotheses were found to be consistent with the data. Only one
hypothesized causal relationship was not supported by the results.
Hypothesis onerefers to the relationship between trust and participation, where
managers' who have a high level of trust in their superiors' would be more likely to
participate in the budgeting process than managers' who do not have a high level of trust
in superiors'. The path coefficient (adirect relationship) between trust and participation
was found to be positive and highly significant, indicating thatthe higher the level of trust
a manager has in his/her superior the greater amount ofparticipation they have in the
budgeting process. Conversely, the lower the level of trust a manager has in his/her
superior the lower the amount of participation in the budgeting process.
As noted earlier, a manager may be unable to avoid participating in the budgeting process
if participation forms partof the manager's contract. A defensive reaction by a manager
in a situation of low trust, such as implementing a program of pseudo-participation, has
not been measured in this study. Rather the participation instrument used in this study
measures true participation, but notpseudo participation. Therefore there is an
assumption built in to this study that managers' are able choose whether to participate or
not, or at least are able to negotiate a level of participation. While the results are
consistent with a causal relationship between trust and participation, it would be
interesting to measure the effect of trust on participation, including pseudo participation.
Hypothesis two states that participation will have a positive and significant effect on
managers goal commitment. The results obtained above are consistent with this
hypothesis with the path coefficient fromparticipation to goal commitment found to be
positive and significant. Where managers' participate in setting budgets and have the
ability to choose or negotiate a level of participation (as discussed above), the level of
commitment to those budgets or goals will be enhanced, as compared with a manager
who does not participate in setting budgets. The act of creating, developing and
implementing goals, or at the very least being involvedin this process, appears to increase
a manager's inclination to devote personal resources to meeting those goals.
As indicated by the path diagram and the results, the relationship between participation
and goal commitment is a direct one. This direct relationship also forms part of the
indirect relationship between participation and PCBS, whereby participation increases
goal commitment, and an increased goal commitment then results in managers' having a
lower PCBS (this part of the relationship will be discussed in more detail when
considering hypothesis six).
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Hypothesis three refers to the impact of truston managers' commitment to organizational
goals. The results from the analysis suggest that the data is consistent witha positive and
highly significantdirect effect of trust on managers' goal commitment. Where lower-
level managers' do not trust their superiors' motives and intentions with regard to the
budgeting process, thesemanagers' will be primarily concerned with coping with this
distrust and its possible consequences, such as job related tension(Ross, 1994). When a
manager is focused on dealing with a potentially threatening situation, and the most
obvious way of obtaining a successful outcome is to manipulate budgets to personal
advantage, that manager willbe unlikely to develop a clearcommitment to the
organizational goals at the possible expense of personal goals. Managers' who have a
high level of trust in the way in which superiors will deal with budgetary matters will be
more likely to have the opportunity to develop this clear commitment to organizational
goals.
Hypothesis four states thatparticipation will have a more significant indirect effecton
managers PCBS through the variable of goal commitment than direct effect on managers'
PCBS. This hypothesis was found to be consistent with the data, as indicated by a more
highly significant indirect path through goal commitment than direct path from
participation to PCBS. The indirect path is negative, suggesting that participation will
reduce a manager's PCBS, by first increasing a manager's level of goal commitment,
which will in turn reduce a manager's PCBS.
As supportedby prior research(Onsi, 1973; Kenis, 1979; Chenhall & Brownell, 1988;
Murray, 1990), the effect of participation on someoutcome measure, in this case a
manager's PCBS, is more complex than a simple directeffect. The resultobtained here
may shed some light on previous conflicting results on the relationshipbetween
participation and specific outcomes, including performance, PCBS and budgetary slack
itself. The statistically significant results obtained here do indicate that there may be
variables missing from prior analyses which have only considered a direct relationship
between participation and outcome measures.
As stated by Murray (1990) participation can have both attitudinal and behavioral
consequences. In light of prior conflicting results on the participation-PCBS relationship
it is logical to draw together theory developedin prior studies linking participation with
attitudinal and behavioral consequences and theory linking participation with outcome
measures to develop a more complete and encompassing framework of causation. Only a
small part of this encompassing framework has been developed and tested here. Future
research opportunities exist in extending the causal linkages proposed in this paper to
move closer to a more complete and encompassing framework of participatory budgeting.
Hypothesis five states that trust will have a negative and statistically significant effect on
managers' PCBS. The data was not consistent with this hypothesis, with the direct path
coefficient from trust to PCBS showing the correct sign but was not statistically
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significant. This result is not consistent with theory developed by Mellinger (1956) and
Read (1962) on the relationship between trust and accuracy of information transferred
from subordinate to superior. Mellinger (1956) and Read (1962) hypothesized and found
that trust directly impacts on the accuracy of information transmitted from subordinate to
superior, where a high level of trust increases the accuracy of information and a low level
of trust reduces the accuracy of information transmitted. The results from this study
suggest that the relationship between trust and PCBS (a clear example of inaccurate
information) may not be a direct relationship but rather may be indirect.
Hypothesis six predicts a direct negative relationship between goal commitment and
managers' PCBS. The data is consistent with this hypothesis and theory developed by
Brownell (1982) and Murray (1990) on the positive relationship between goal
commitment and amount of effort extended to some outcome. Where managers' are
highly committed to organizational goals they will extend more effort into reaching those
goals and as a result will have a lower inclination to incorporate slack into budgets.
Hypothesis seven states that trust will have a significant indirect effect on PCBS through
the variable of goal commitment. This relationship is hypothesized to be negative and
highly significant, where a high level of trust is predicted to increase goal commitment,
which in turn will decrease a manager's PCBS.
The indirect effect of trust on managers PCBS through the variable of goal commitment
is statistically significant. This suggests that a subordinate manager who has a high level
of trust in his/her superior with regard to budgeting matters is likely to have a lower
propensity to create budgetary slack because he/she has a high level of commitment to the
goals. This indirect relationship has two components: the positive direct relationship
between trust and goal commitment and the negative direct relationship between goal
commitment and PCBS. The overall effect of these two paths is a negative indirect
relationship between trust and PCBS.
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7.0 LIMITATIONS:
There are several limitations associated with the methodology used in this study. First,
non-response bias is a problem associated withmail surveys. In this case there is an
acceptable response rate (as reported in the results section of this paper), however for
those who have not responded to the survey, we know nothing about how their answers
may have varied from those who have responded.
Secondly, although anonymity has been promised, the sensitive nature ofbudgetary slack
makes 'socialdesirability bias' a concern (Merchant, 1985). Further, the measure of
propensity to create budgetary slack was modified from Onsi's (1973) version and assuch
there is no evidenceregarding its validity which could be drawn from prior research.
Naturally this is a limitation associated with any instrument that is newly developed or
modified from prior use.
Thirdly, survey studies do notallow important variables to becontrolled, leading to a
tradeoff between internal validity and external validity. The problems with internal
validity mean that results can be said to beonly consistent with the theory, rather than
proving causation. This limitation must also be noted for the use of the statistical
technique of pathanalysis. The results of this analysis do not represent proofof causal
relationships. The results can only be said to beconsistent with the theory developed in
this paper. The ability to infer causation is a function of theresearch design leading to the
data, not the manner in which the data are statistically analyzed (Chenhall and Brownell,
1988, p.232).
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8.0 Implications and Conclusion;
The results of this study have practical implications for corporate management.
Managers can increase the likelihood of willing participation by subordinate managers in
the budgeting process by fostering relationships between superiors and subordinates that
are characterized by high levels of trust. According to the literature (Read, 1962;
Blakeney, 1986; Ross, 1994; Mellinger, 1990) a relationship characterized by hightrust is
one in which a superior manager shows consideration for a subordinate manager's views
and opinions, shows concern for a subordinate manager's well-being, displays a
supportive attitude and is able to solve disputes rather than lay blame.
Top level management can increase the likelihood that lower level managers will be
highly committed to organizational goals by encouraging anenvironment of participatory
budgeting for all levels of management, and by fostering relationships between the
management levels that arecharacterized by high levels of trust. A high level of goal
commitment may have positive outcomes such as increasing congruence between the
organization's goals and themanager's goals thereby reducing the likelihood of
dysfunctional behavior suchas incorporation of slack into budgets (Kamin & Ronen,
1981); increasing the strength of managers' intentions to reach these goals (Tubbs, 1993);
and increasing managers' performance (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Erez & Arad, 1986).
This studyprovides support for the framework of participatory budgeting proposed in this
paper. Direct and indirect relationships between thevariables of trust, participation,
goalcommitment andPCBS have been hypothesized and tested here. Results support a
direct and positive relationship between trustandparticipation, where a subordinate
manager who has a high level of trust in their superior manager will be more likely to
participate in the budgeting process. Goal commitment was found to be higher where
managers participate in the budgeting process and/or wheremanagers have a high level of
trust in superiors. The relationship between trust and goal commitment has both a
significant directcomponent and a significant indirect component. Managers' PCBS was
found to be lower where goal commitment was high. The relationship between goal
commitment and PCBS has both direct and indirect components, where trust and
participation were found to have indirect effects on PCBS through goal commitment, and
goal commitment was found to have a significant directeffecton PCBS. Results suggest
that participation and trust do not have a directeffect on PCBS.
The use of path analysis has provided the ability to decompose relationships into direct,
indirect and spurious effects. The information acquired from such analysis is valuable as
it provides more detail than ordinary regression analysis on the relationship between two
variables, and allows more realistic analysis of interrelationships between a number of
variables. For example, ordinary regression analysis is limited by the assumption that the
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relationship between three independentvariablesand one dependent variable is
simultaneous, without allowing for detailed analysis of the interrelationships between the
three independent variables (in which one or more of these variables may be dependent
on the others). As noted by Lukka (1988,p.298) budgetary biasing is a complex and
many-sided phenomenon that is the result of an interplay of many different factors.
The results obtained from the path analysis do provide an insight into the complex
interrelationships that may exist between variables in an organizational setting.
Further research is required to extend on the framework developed and tested here and to
shed more light on an unexpected result. As noted earlier, the results obtained in this
study on the trust-participation relationship could be strengthened by investigating the
effect of trust on participation where pseudo-participation can be measured. This would
in effect allow measurement of a manager's compliance reaction (Mellinger, 1956) to a
situationcharacterized by low trust. Currently, the result obtained here is limitedby the
assumption thatmanagers can choose whether to participate in thebudgeting process, or
at the least can negotiate on this, without allowing for defensive reactions by managers'
where this is not possible.
Further research is required into the relationship between trust and managers' PCBS,
where the hypothesized direct relationship between these variables was not supported by
the results. Prior research (Mellinger, 1956; Read, 1962;Blakeney, 1986) has supported
a direct relationship between trust and accuracy of information, however a significant
indirect relationship between these variables, through the variable of goal commitment -
that is was indicated by the results.
Finally, further researchis required in extending the explanatory framework developed
and tested here. The incorporation of additional variables such as locus of control,
perceivedenvironmental uncertainty, information asymmetry, emphasis on budget
outcome and performance evaluation style into the framework proposed here would
extend on existing research by providing a more in depth analysis of interrelationships
between these variables and managers' PCBS. The extension of this framework to
incorporate a greater number of variables and more complex arrangementof
interrelationships, provides a closer approximation to reality which increases the value of
such research to corporate management.
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APPENDIX ONE:
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
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UNIVERSITY LETTERHEAD
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Please find attached a copy of the
questionnaire and a reply paidenvelope. Would you please fill out the questionnaire and
return it to me as soon as possible. The questionnaire should take about 20 minutes to
complete.
The purpose of this research is to enableme to complete my honours degree. The greater
numberof questionnaires that are retumed the more meaningful will be the results of the
study.
Please be assured that all responses will be treated confidentially. The results of your
questionnaire will be combined with results obtainedfrom questionnaires completed by
individuals in a number of organisations and only summarised results will be used in any
research publications.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
Janelle Large.
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UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE
ATTITUDE TOWARD BUDGETING QUESTIONNAIRE
All information collated in this questionnaire is completely anonymous and
confidential. No response will be attributed to any individual and only
sununary data will be used in the analysis.
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Part A: General Details
1. Please state your job title and a brief description of the job.
2. How many years have you been in this job?
3. How many years have you been withyour present employer?
4. Please indicateapproximately how many people areemployedin the department/work
unit to which you belong by placing aVin the appropriate box.
Less than 10.
10-19.
20-49.
50-99.
100-199.
200-499.
500-999.
More than 1000.
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5. Please indicate approximately how many peopleare employed in the total organisation
for which you work by placing aVin the appropriate box.
Less than 10.
10-19.
20-49.
50-99.
100-199.
200-499.
500-999.
More than 1000.
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Part B: Attitude toward budgeting process
For each of the following questions, please circle one number:
1.To protect himself, a manager proposes a budget thatcan be safely attained.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2. A manager can propose twolevels of standards: one between himself and lower-level
management, and another standard between himself and top management, to be safe.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3. In good business times, a reasonable level of slack in a departmental budget is
acceptable.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. Slack in the budget is an appropriate way of making provision for things that cannot be
officially approved.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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Part C: Participation in the Budgeting Process:
1. The budget is finalised only when I am satisfied with it.
12 3 4
Strongly
Disagree
2. New budgets include changes I have suggested.
12 3 4
Strongly
Disagree
5
Strongly
Agree
5
Strongly
Agree
3.1 investigate favorable as well as unfavorable variances for my department.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. Preparing the budgetfor my department required my attending to a greatnumber of
details.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5.1 personally investigate budget variances in my department.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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Part C: Relationship With Superior
For each of the following questions, please circle one number:
1. Does your superior take advantageof opportunities that come up to further your
interests by his actions and decisions?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Always
2. How free do you feel to discuss with your superiorthe problems and difficulties you
have in your job withoutjeopardizing your position or having it 'held against' you later
on 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Always
3. How confidentdo you feel that your superior keeps you fully and frankly informed
about things that might concern you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Always
4. Superiors at times must makedecisions which seemto be against the interests of their
subordinates. When this happens to you as a subordinate, how much trust do you
have that your superior's decision is justified by other considerations?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Always
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Part D: Attitude Toward Budget Goals:
1. I am strongly committed to meeting the budget objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2. Quitefrankly I don't care if I achieve thebudget objectives or not.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3. It is quite likely that the budget objectives may need toberevised, depending on how
we progress against those objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. It wouldn't take much for me to abandon the budget objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. It is unrealistic for me to expect to reach the budget objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
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i6. Since it is not always possible to tell how tough meeting the budget is until you have
worked on it for a while, it is hard to take the budget objective seriously.
1
Strongly
Disagree
7. I think these budget objectives are good to aim at.
1
Strongly
Disagree
7
Strongly
Agree
7
Strongly
Agree
Please place the completedquestionnaire in the envelope provided and mail as soon as
possible.
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY.
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APPENDIX TWO
PROPENSITY TO CREATE BUDGETARY SLACK
THE ORIGINAL ONSI INSTRUMENT
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Four item instrument developed and used by Onsi (1973) to measure propensity to create
budgetary slack:
1. To protect himself, a manager submits a budget that can be safely attained.
2. The plant manager sets two levels ofstandards: one between himself and production
(sales) manager, and another standard between himself and top management, to be
safe.
3. Ingood business times, the plant manager accepts a reasonable level of slack in a
departmental budget.
4. Slack in thebudget is good to do things that cannot be officially approved.
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